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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DAMAGE CONTROL INTERDISCIPLINARITY: AN ANTIDOTE TO
DEATH DESPAIR IN MILITARY MEDICINE
ERIKA “ANN” JESCHKE*
ABSTRACT
“Diseases of despair” is a conceptually broad category used to describe the
phenomenon of premature mortality caused by suicide, drug poisoning, and
alcoholic liver disease. Central to this conceptualization of mortality is that
death occurs too early in an entire population of individuals infected with social
despair. Implicit in the diseases of despair construct is a powerful normative
claim about the manner and time of death—that death is bad if it is
contextualized in unwanted conditions and happens before reaching midlife. As
such, diseases of despair ought to be reduced, if not eliminated. Interestingly,
military medical research on combat casualties abides by a comparable
normative understanding of mortality—that combat provides a less than optimal
context in which to die and that those who die on the battlefield do so too young.
In response to this implicit normative ideal, military medical research and
practice have made major strides in developing effective life-saving
interventions in the past twenty years. Service members’ lives are saved after
catastrophic injury due to advances in the combat damage control medical
paradigm. The achievements of this paradigm are enshrined in an overall
ninety-two percent survival rate for service members injured in Iraq and
* Erika “Ann” Jeschke began her academic career at Georgetown University, where she studied
German linguistics and theology. She continued her training at Harvard Divinity School, focusing
on analysis of ancient texts. Almost a decade later, Ann began her doctorate from Saint Louis
University’s Center for Health Care Ethics, where she successfully defended a dissertation that
reframed military concepts of trauma, resilience, and post-deployment reintegration. Her
overarching research has been grounded in the following question: What does it mean to care
amidst violence? Ann’s work heavily relies on the use of medical humanities and anthropology to
articulate culturally sensitive concerns in the ethics of combat casualty care. She seeks to expand
the traditional medical context of caring beyond the clinic and physician-patient dyad to include
social practices as communal rituals to heal and reintegrate social identity after collective trauma.
Her current research portfolio addresses ethical concerns related to the provision of combat casualty
care and post-deployment social reintegration. Ann is actively researching how death, dying, and
disfigurement influence the formation of the warrior of care’s sense of self. Currently, Ann is an
adjunct professor at George Washington University in the Peace Studies Program, a research
consultant to the United States Army Institute for Surgical Research, and an ethics consultant to
the Special Operations Medicine Prolonged Field Care Working Group.
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Afghanistan and have initiated interest in achieving zero preventable deaths
after catastrophic injury in both military and civilian medicine. While medical
achievements in Iraq and Afghanistan are laudable, primarily focusing on
achieving zero preventable combat deaths constructs a military-medical culture
wherein the despair of death is implicitly woven into military health policy,
training, and organizational culture. This article will explore the complex
challenge of addressing death despair in combat casualty management. I
develop a modest argument suggesting that to effectively shift expectations
relative to death and dying in casualty management, the Defense Health Agency
needs to support interdisciplinary research that focuses on strategic secondorder organizational change before developing health policy and medical
training in preparation for future large-scale combat operations. In specific, I
suggest that this interdisciplinary team needs to be led by academic experts in
anthropology, history, and political science in collaboration with military
medical and strategic experts.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020]

DAMAGE CONTROL INTERDISCIPLINARITY

203

I. INTRODUCTION
“Diseases of despair” is a conceptually broad category used to describe the
phenomenon of premature mortality caused by suicide, drug poisoning, and
alcoholic liver disease. 1 Literature on this topic has traditionally investigated
despair as a population-based pathology affecting the health of entire segments
of society as a result of economic stagnation. Central to this conceptualization
of mortality is that death occurs too early in an entire population of individuals
infected with social despair. Implicit in the diseases of despair construct is a
powerful normative claim about the manner and time of death—that death is bad
if it is contextualized in unwanted conditions and happens before reaching
midlife. As such, diseases of despair ought to be reduced if not completely
eliminated. 2 Interestingly, military medical research on combat casualties abides
by a comparable normative understanding of mortality—that combat provides a
less than optimal context in which to die and that those who die on the battlefield
do so too young. In response to this implicit normative ideal, military medical
research and practice has made major strides in developing effective life-saving
interventions in the past twenty years. Service members’ lives are saved after
catastrophic injury due to advances in the combat damage control medical
paradigm. The achievements of this paradigm are enshrined in an overall ninetytwo percent survival rate for service members injured in Iraq and Afghanistan. 3
Damage control was originally a Navy term coined to describe the process
of minimizing and containing the impact of damage to a battleship. 4 The primary
goal of this process is to control flooding to preserve the stability and buoyancy
of a ship while maintaining maximum offensive power. 5 Like with battleships,
damage control medicine seeks to minimize and contain the impact of major
trauma sustained to the human body in combat. 6 The initial goal is to stop
bleeding and contain contamination to stabilize major bodily functions. 7
Ongoing treatment involves abbreviated operations and intensive care unit
resuscitation, followed by definitive surgical interventions. 8 Once a touchpoint
1. Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st Century, 2017
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 397, 398.
2. See generally Lilly Shanahan et al., Does Despair Really Kill? A Roadmap for an
Evidence-Based Answer, 109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 854, 854–858 (2019) (highlighting the need for
further research into disease of despair).
3. David Vergun, Survival Rates Improving for Soldiers Wounded in Combat, Says Army
Surgeon General, ARMY NEWS SERV. (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.army.mil/article/173808/sur
vival_rates_improving_for_soldiers_wounded_in_combat_says_army_surgeon_general.
4. Juan C. Duchesne et al., Damage Control Resuscitation: The New Face of Damage
Control, 69 J. TRAUMA: INJ., INFECTION, & CRITICAL CARE 976, 976 (2010).
5. NAVAL DAMAGE CONTROL TRAINING CTR., HANDBOOK OF DAMAGE CONTROL,
NAVPERS 16191, 169 (1945), https://maritime.org/doc/dc/index.htm.
6. Duchesne et al., supra note 4, at 976.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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for controversy in civilian medicine, the combat damage control paradigm was
optimized in Iraq and Afghanistan by relying on global aero-evacuation
capabilities that allowed for quick battlefield evacuation and transcontinental
transportation through several military surgical facilities before arriving at
definitive medical care. 9 Due to its incredible success at saving service
members’ lives, this trauma care paradigm initiated interest in achieving zero
preventable deaths after catastrophic injury in both military and civilian
medicine. 10
While medical achievements in Iraq and Afghanistan are laudable, primarily
focusing on achieving zero preventable combat deaths constructs a militarymedical culture wherein the despair of death is implicitly woven into military
health policy, training, and organizational culture. 11 Considering that force
protection is an important aspect of military leadership and command, death
despair may seem like a frivolous, or even deleterious, research topic. However,
if such deaths remain unaddressed, it could lead to a host of concealed and
potentially destructive consequences for service members, the military
organization, national security, and civilian society at large. 12
Currently, geopolitical tensions have caused military strategists in the
United States to prepare for the possibility of large-scale combat operations
(LSCO) akin to battles fought in World War I and II. 13 The future multi-domain
battlefield will be distributed across vast geographic terrain and integrate
capabilities in air, cyberspace, land, maritime, and space domains. 14
Furthermore, the U.S. will not necessarily maintain dominance on such multi9. Lorne H. Blackbourne, Combat Damage Control Surgery, 36 CRITICAL CARE MED. S304,
S304 (Supp. 2008).
10. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI. ENG’G MED., A NATIONAL TRAUMA CARE SYSTEM:
INTEGRATING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TRAUMA SYSTEMS TO ACHIEVE ZERO PREVENTABLE
DEATHS AFTER INJURY 1 (2016), http://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/Reports/2016/A-Nation
al-Trauma-Care-System-Integrating-Military-and-Civilian-Trauma-Systems.aspx.
11. It might be better to say reinforces a culture of death despair. While these articles are not
specifically about death, they explore the concept of casualty aversion arguing that this
phenomenon is not attributable to the broader civilian public, but the military policy and leadership.
See, e.g., Richard A. Lacquement Jr., The Casualty-Aversion Myth, 57 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 39,
39–57 (2004). See generally, e.g., CHARLES K. HYDE, CASUALTY AVERSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR
POLICY MAKERS AND SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS 16–18 (2000). Implicit in the idea of casualty
aversion is despair of death. Lacquement Jr., supra note 11, at 39–57; HYDE, supra note 11, at 16–
18. See infra section II of this article for more about despair of death.
12. Albert Palazzo, No Casualties Please, We’re Soldiers, 5 AUSTRALIAN ARMY J. 65, 66
(2008).
13. See generally David G. Perkins, Preparing for the Fight Tonight: Multi-Domain Battle
and Field Manual 3-0, 97 MIL. REV. 6, 7–8 (2017) (discussing what we have learned from previous
World Wars and how it should influence our future preparation) [hereinafter Perkins, Preparing
for the Fight Tonight].
14. David G. Perkins, Multi-Domain Battle: Driving Change to Win in the Future, 97 MIL.
REV. 6, 6–7 (2017).
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domain battlefields because “Russia and China have developed considerable
capabilities for constraining U.S. military strengths.” 15 Entering armed conflict
with a near-peer enemy poses many challenges to military medicine not present
in counterinsurgency operations (COIN), making the practice of medicine
frighteningly more complex. 16 The strong possibility of anti-access and area
denial would force greater distances between medical care facilities and degrade
the current global transport system. 17 In other words, it will be impossible to
sustain the combat damage control paradigm that provides life-saving care to
catastrophically injured service members because the military will not have the
luxury of quick medical evacuation to a higher level of combat casualty care.
Military medical experts within the Defense Health Agency (DHA) project that
fighting a near-peer enemy on a multi-domain battlefield could result in
thousands of casualties at one time and up to 40,000 casualties per month. 18
Amidst such conditions, tactical necessity will restrict medical access, govern
distribution of scarce medical resources, and compel reverse triage—providing
care to the least injured first—to conserve the fighting force. 19 The practical
outcome is that death will become an ever-present reality for military care
providers who are serving far forward on a multi-domain battlefield.
This article will explore the complex challenge of addressing deaths of
despair in combat casualty management as the U.S. and its North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies prepare for LSCO on a multi-domain battlefield
with near-peer enemies. What I have noticed from my initial phase of research
on the topic of casualty management in LSCO is two interlocking needs that
ground all other research, training, and policy discussions moving forward. First,
there needs to be a shift in expectations around death and dying when discussing
the nature of catastrophic injury and specifically, to include death not only as a
medical possibility in relationship to catastrophic injury, but also a central aspect
of medical decision-making in LSCO. Second, there is a need to create a
comprehensive conceptual map of the broad spectrum of challenges that must
be addressed in shifting these expectations. In this article, I develop a modest
argument suggesting that to effectively shift expectations relative to death and
dying in casualty management, the DHA needs to support interdisciplinary
research that focuses on strategic second-order organizational change before
15. Perkins, Preparing for the Fight Tonight, supra note 13, at 10. See also Jim Garamone,
Work Details Multidomain Battlefield of the Future, DOD NEWS (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.de
fense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/963806/work-details-multidomain-battlefield-of-thefuture/.
16. Todd E. Rasmussen et al., Combat Casualty Care Research for the Multidomain
Battlefield, 83 J. TRAUMA & ACUTE CARE SURGERY S1, S1 (Supp. 2017).
17. Id.
18. Col. Michael Davis, Ever Adapting for the Warfighter: Future DoD Medical Battlespace
Preparedness (Sept. 24, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
19. Id.
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developing health policy and medical training for LSCO. More specifically, I
suggest that this interdisciplinary team needs to be led by academic experts in
anthropology, history, and political science in collaboration with military
medical and strategic experts.
A.

Personal Orientation to Research

The genesis of my interest in this topic took place two years ago at the
Military Health System Research Symposium when an audience member asked
a combat casualty care researcher whether the American public was prepared for
future mass casualty scenarios in LSCO. As I spoke with this researcher, he
shared his concern that the Ranger Regiment, which has achieved zero
preventable combat deaths, may have created an even bigger dilemma. This
individual feared that the lack of familiarity with death and dying would likely
overwhelm inexperienced military care providers thereby negatively impacting
their performance. Since that day, I have been attempting to better grasp the
importance of explicitly acknowledging, accepting, and preparing for death as a
possible outcome in battlefield medicine.
My long-term project is to develop an intricate set of interwoven arguments
for why medicine needs to be at both the international and national strategic
planning table when discussing LSCO. In the past, the critical role medicine has
played in military operations has been drastically undervalued, if not summarily
overlooked. Recently, I read the book Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban
Operations, in which the editors posed a set of normative questions that must be
explored in order to ethically and effectively prepare for future combat. 20
Although implicit in every question posed, medicine was nowhere to be found. 21
It is my overarching contention that ignorance of the central role medicine plays
in armed conflict is only to the detriment of our military missions and national
security. Furthermore, it obstructs the ability to develop informed, effective
health policy that guides just and humane responses to the human cost of
warfare.
Being an interdisciplinary scholar who speaks to and writes for many
different audiences, experience has taught me that those unfamiliar with the
intersection of academic military, including ethics, medicine, strategy, and
health policy may be skeptical about my agenda or the purpose of my
scholarship. At a recent military conference, many audience members thought I
was suggesting that the current orientation toward death in casualty management
was unethical, while others pressed for “the right answer.” The largest group
was stymied by my topic, suggesting that preparing for death in LSCO was not
an ethical problem but one of expectation management which had nothing to do
20. See generally DONN A. STARRY, BLOCK BY BLOCK: THE CHALLENGES OF URBAN
OPERATIONS (William G. Robertson & Lawrence A. Yates eds., 2006).
21. Id.
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with morality. In other words, my work did not fall within the realm of what was
deemed as proper ethics research. At a military ethics conference, I was told that
medicine does not belong in military ethics, which focuses on the appropriate
amount of violence to be used when subduing the enemy or what weapons
should be developed in response to future threats. Similarly, when talking to
military strategists, I mentioned that military care providers perform tasks
central to national security, and I questioned why military medicine was
nonetheless omitted from strategic planning for LSCO. My insights and
questions perplexed those present because they had never considered how
medicine might impact national security or be essential to military strategic
planning. Finally, my academic colleagues who focus on health policy fear that
researching the medical realities of LSCO is akin to a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Catherine Lutz well captures the ethical paradox implicit in preparing for future
conflict scenarios by saying that such activities must “draw on culturally tutored
imagination, fears, and wishes” that constructs a situation where “experiments
on new forms of violence might work.” 22 I believe the implicit fear is a belief
that in researching the ethics of mass casualty, that I might be ethically
supporting LSCO as the necessary and good outcome of international policy.
My point in relating this information is not to resolve the inherent paradoxes
of my chosen inquiry but to clearly establish that I recognize that my topic and
method is contentious to many people on numerous levels. For this reason, I
want to explicitly clarify how I understand my role as an academic military
medical ethicist to lay the groundwork for what you, the reader, can expect from
me. My analytic goal is to bring to light various challenges in the provision of
medical care on the future battlefield. My deliverable is provided in the form of
argumentative papers that are meant to explain why certain actions should or
should not be taken. From my view, all things are open to ethical evaluation and
argumentation. While arguments can serve to justify actions or the direction of
research, funding, training, and policy, they rarely—if ever—provide final
answers about ultimate truth, goodness, or rightness. Instead these arguments
give shape to often amorphous problems in the applied world of research. As
such, I value the discipline of ethics not simply because it sifts through
information to construct valid and sound arguments, but also because the process
of exploring complex, often unanswerable questions, helps prepare for the
morally murky game of life.
Being an interdisciplinary scholar, I see my role as one in which I help guide
my broader audience—in this case, military and policy stakeholders—through
the following process: to ask critical questions to clearly define abstract
concerns, to determine to whom the questions need to be addressed, and to
explore what methods of research will allow theoretical questions to be
22. CATHERINE LUTZ, HOMEFRONT: A MILITARY CITY AND THE AMERICAN TWENTIETH
CENTURY 87–88 (2001).
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translated into practical and concrete outcomes that provide scope for effective
informed training and policy. While many of you may disagree with my
academic orientation on ethics, I hope my analysis evokes passionate and
inquisitive responses to this multi-layered topic.
B.

Assumptions, Objections, Counter-Objections

The world of battlefield medicine—particularly, casualty management—is
ostensibly one of the most complicated moral grey-zones, with few black and
white solutions. Nonetheless, medical decisions must be made, acted upon, and
lived with while operating in the proverbial fog of war. Being a just war
theorist 23 who is open to the possibility of justified violence in support of
national security, I believe there is an appropriate role for medicine to play in
preparing for and responding to the human carnage of war. While my topic does
not precisely fit within one domain of just war analysis, I am assuming that if
the U.S. engages in LSCO with a near-peer enemy, then such a conflict would
achieve the ad bellum criteria of ethical justification. Even if justified, not all
actions in bello are justified. Therefore, I also assume it is essential to critically
evaluate how military medicine ought to appropriately support national security
interests. These assumptions allow me to evaluate questions pertaining to how
military medicine ought to prepare for and engage in casualty management in
LSCO.
Turning to the specific topic of this article, I am not going to argue that
expectations around death and dying must shift in order to effectively manage
combat casualties. I am simply assuming this is a necessary function of
preparation for LSCO. The assumption that addressing death despair is critical
to national security does not imply that casualty management primarily focused
on life-saving medical interventions is inappropriate or unethical. It is simply
that different battlefields require different ways of practicing medicine in
relationship to catastrophic injury. I anticipate that some of you will disagree
with my assumptions. Amongst military medical audiences, there have been two
common rejoinders to my topic of research to which I will respond.
The first is: “Why do we need to train clinicians to deal with death? Human
beings are adaptive. They will figure out what to do!” I agree that human beings
are highly adaptive, but adaptation at its best is a function of intense training that
engenders a sense of certainty in one’s excellence. I absolutely believe that the
trope “Let them Adapt” is as ethically callous when considering the casualty
23. See generally A.J. COATES, THE ETHICS OF WAR 2 (2d ed. 2016) (discussing St.
Augustine’s foundational role in establishing the just war theory as a moral good, such as with the
principle that “just war is consistent with an ethic of love, involving as it does the willingness to
die that others might live.”). See also, e.g., NIGEL BIGGAR, IN DEFENCE OF WAR (2013) (arguing
that war can be just when it punishes grave injustice, such as in the cases of conflicts in Rwanda,
Kosovo, and Iraq).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020]

DAMAGE CONTROL INTERDISCIPLINARITY

209

numbers that are being discussed in LSCO. Furthermore, such a notion of
adaptation is akin to asking a ten-year-old with only introductory piano lessons
and little practice to perform a Bach composition with proficiency. While the
ten-year-old will play something, they will not fluently make sense of the
musical score or excellently perform. If playing Bach is akin to dealing with
death and dying, clinicians will have some metaphorical musical training, but
without shifting expectations from life-saving to death care, those clinicians who
are far forward on the future battlefield will not likely make sense of the
situations or perform well in the face of mass casualties.
The second is: “It is impossible to predict the future. We cannot know what
we do not know.” While I agree that we cannot perfectly predict the future or
completely control the battlefield, military strategists and planners have been
involved in war-gaming other aspects of LSCO. In fact, that is precisely the job
of military strategists—to construct hypothetical scenarios that will provide
insights into the nature of future conflict for the purposes of preparation.
Suggesting that we should not plan for the medical reality of LSCO because we
cannot know the future is a huge oversight that is not made of other mission
critical aspects of military operations. Furthermore, to think we should only
research options that allow complete control of the battlefield misses the entire
phenomenology of combat. According to Carl von Clausewitz, the two
consistent aspects of the battlefield are the friction and fog of war. 24 His response
to working effectively within those constant scenarios is training. 25 As such,
military research, strategy, and policy must strike a balance between describing
the contours of future battlefield scenarios while developing training that
engenders the service member’s confidence and operating in an ever-changing
environment.
I hypothesize that this rejoinder is common amongst military commanders
and military medical experts because military medicine has never had a seat at
the military strategic planning table. Consequently, military medicine takes a
backseat to the planning while military strategists seek to find ways to increase
lethality and capacity on and off the battlefield. Ironically, military medicine is
central to dealing with both of those issues. The question is not whether we can
predict the future with some modicum of success—that is the purpose of all
applied research—but which disciplines are best suited to perform the analysis
of the unique and complex challenges of death despair in military medicine.
C. Terminology and Outline of Analysis
I specifically chose to title this article Damage Control Interdisciplinarity
because death despair in military medicine could be potentially life-threating to
24. See generally CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 46, 66–68, 88–89 (Michael Howard &
Peter Paret trans., 2007).
25. Id. at 68–69.
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military missions in LSCO. The implication is that, like naval or medical damage
control, interdisciplinary research will be able to outline major challenges that
threaten military success and provide effective training and policy solutions for
addressing these challenges. By interdisciplinary research, I mean a mode of
integrated research that relies on a collaborative team of scholars who possess
specialized expertise in different theories and methodologies to advance
fundamental knowledge on a complex topic that is beyond the scope of a single
discipline or field of research. 26 Important to my argument is the word
“complexity.” I do not seek to clearly articulate all challenges associated with
shifting expectations around death and dying in casualty management. I seek to
highlight the enormity of the task and suggest how interdisciplinary research can
serve to develop a comprehensive conceptual map of the challenges associated
with shifting expectations in casualty management. This map will serve as a
metaphorical damage control manual for death despair in preparation for LSCO.
Although combat casualty care includes life-saving care for contractors,
civilians, and enemy combatants, I base my analysis on injured service members
in the U.S. military for two main reasons. First, the implicit normative
orientation I am calling “death despair” focuses almost exclusively on injured
service members. 27 Second, performing meticulous epidemiological data
analysis on long-term outcomes for those not captured in the DHA medical
tracking system is beyond the scope of this article and my scholarly expertise.
You will also note, that I am using the broad terms “catastrophic injury” and
“casualty management” instead of “expectant casualty” and “reverse triage”
throughout this article. The use of these terms is purposeful. In a resource rich
environment, medical decision-making is not focused on sorting severity of
injuries but on providing the appropriate intervention for all injured. 28 As such,
management of catastrophic injuries need not necessarily acknowledge death as
a possible outcome. In fact, medical decision-making in resource rich
environments tends to focus on doing everything possible to potentiate saving

26. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI. ENG’G & INST. OF MED., FACILITATING INTERDISCIPLINARY
RESEARCH 26 (2004).
27. Casualty management is similar throughout the NATO partners. See E. Falzone et al.,
Triage in Military Settings, 36 ANAESTHESIA CRITICAL CARE & PAIN MED. 43, 45 (2017). I will
at times reference the following two works that highlight my global point that death despair is an
implicit aspect of casualty management. See id. See also EMILY MAYHEW, A HEAVY RECKONING:
WAR, MEDICINE AND SURVIVAL IN AFGHANISTAN AND BEYOND (2017); Palazzo, supra note 12.
28. E. ANN JESCHKE & SARAH L. HUFFMAN, REIMAGINING ‘HONORABLE DEATH’ IN FUTURE
LARGE SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS 69, 74 (2019). See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD
MANUAL 8-55: PLANNING FOR HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT 4-5 (1994) (defining “evacuation
tenets” and explaining that “[e]vacuation begins at the location where the injury or illness occurs
and continues as far as the patient’s medical condition warrants or the military situation requires”).
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life. 29 Classification of an “expectant casualty” necessarily requires the sorting
of injured into triage categories that are determined by how severe the injury is
in comparison to death—”expectant” meaning that the casualty is expected to
die. 30 Triage also, by definition, implies acknowledging the possibility of death
and a resource constrained environment. 31 More specific to military medicine,
reverse triage implies not only acknowledging the possibility of death, but also
accepting it as a foregone conclusion because limited medical resources are
given to the least injured in order to return as many warfighters to the battlefield
as possible and to conserve the fighting force. 32 In describing the COIN combat
damage control paradigm using these broader terms, I am attempting to illustrate
that expectant casualty is a specific form of catastrophic injury and that reverse
triage is a specific form of casualty management whose distinction hinges on
death in austere conditions. More importantly, these distinctions will have
radical implications for medical decision-making in LSCO casualty
management. If military care providers are not prepared to acknowledge and
accept death, they will struggle to perform the decision-making necessary to
support mission success in LSCO. 33 For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to casualty
management as the COIN or LSCO paradigm throughout the rest of this article.
My argument will unfold in the following manner. First, I briefly describe
the resource rich context in which the COIN paradigm operates. This section
will illustrate how death despair manifests in the COIN paradigm, what
expectations are engendered by this challenge, and how these expectations, if
not shifted, might hinder military operations in LSCO. To conclude this section,
I present a visual diagram that delineates how to capture various component
pieces related to the broad scope of challenges associated with shifting
expectations in casualty management. Second, I describe a theory of strategic
organizational change relative to effective training and policy development to
show why it is important that the interdisciplinary research team be led by
external academics. I also explain the importance of relying on academics who
specialize in the disciplines of anthropology, history, and political science in
collaboration with military medical and strategic experts and describe the
various roles each will play in the interdisciplinary team. Finally, I will conclude
29. See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 28, at 4-13 (defining “casualty management
system” and requiring “[p]rompt movement of patients . . . to avoid increased morbidity and
mortality.”).
30. MASCAL SOP, U.S. AIR FORCE (Apr. 10, 1997), http://www.usafp.org/previous/op_med
/milmedsop/mascalsop.html (defining “expectant” as “casualties who will die in the existing field
medical care support system, or would require exhaustive efforts to temporarily extend their life.”).
31. BORDEN INST., EMERGENCY WAR SURGERY 29 (4th ed. 2013).
32. Michael S. Baker, Creating Order from Chaos: Part I: Triage, Initial Care, and Tactical
Considerations in Mass Casualty and Disaster Response, 172 MIL. MED. 232, 232–33 (2007).
33. See generally JESCHKE & HUFFMAN, supra note 28, at 72–75 (discussing a military
professional’s experience treating a dying warfighter).
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by returning to the construct of diseases of despair to reflect on some of the
hidden costs of death despair in military medicine.
II. THE COIN PARADIGM: DEATH DESPAIR
As previously mentioned, the COIN paradigm has existed in an extremely
resource-rich medical environment that has allowed for an unprecedented
overall survival rate exceeding ninety-two percent. 34 As Michael R. Hetzler
points out: “A controlled, methodical, and scalable conflict has provided almost
every known need and cost while extraordinary efforts in lifesaving have
become the norm.” 35 Providing access to advanced and intensive damage control
medical interventions has been predominantly enabled by quick evacuation of
causalities off the battlefield to higher levels of definitive medical care. 36 Hetzler
also points out that in “the pursuit of ensuring zero preventable deaths” military
care providers focus “on the details of therapeutics” and base medical decisionmaking on the “assumptions of resource availability, clinical expertise in
oversight, and the presence of ideal conditions.” 37 Consequently, catastrophic
injury in the COIN paradigm has rarely included death and dying. Catastrophic
injury is more accurately captured in COIN operations by extreme disfigurement
or dismemberment of the body. 38 This is not to suggest that death has never
occurred. However, the COIN paradigm does not include a robust appreciation
or acceptance of the possibility that a catastrophically injured warfighter may be
in the process of dying or die. 39 All military medical training, research, and
policy singularly focus on life-saving medicine. 40 In fact, the Combat Casualty
34. Vergun, supra note 3.
35. Michael R. Hetzler, A Case for Improvised Medical Training, J. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
MED., Winter 2019, at 123, 123.
36. See generally Vergun, supra note 3 (illustrating how quick evacuation has helped our
troops in Afghanistan).
37. Hetzler, supra note 35, at 123.
38. See MAYHEW, supra note 27, at intro.
39. Both of the following books explore the impact of casualty management in relationship to
individual service members whose lives are saved after catastrophic injury requiring multiple
surgeries. Emily Mayhew, a British historian of combat casualty care, looks at five service members
from point of injury on the battlefield through rehabilitation in the United Kingdom. Zoë Wool, an
American anthropologist, looks specifically at the ordinary life of six injured service members after
returning home. These books help establish the singular focus on life-saving medical interventions
in relationship to catastrophic injury and provide descriptive detail concerning the nature of
catastrophic injury in combat casualty care. See generally MAYHEW, supra note 27; ZOË WOOL,
AFTER WAR: THE WEIGHT OF LIFE AT WALTER REED 19 (2015).
40. In reviewing countless military medical training manuals, calls for research and funded
research, as well as DHA policy guidelines, I have yet to see anything mentioned concerning death
or dying. Having attended the major military medical conferences for the past three years, I have
heard military medical care providers advocate singularly for technological devices that will
continue to save lives on the battlefield. I have yet to hear, see, or read anything concerning death
in combat casualty care. In fact, when discussing the idea of using the word in training manuals, I
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Care Research Program prioritizes research funding for new life-saving
strategies focused on advanced “surgical techniques, biological and mechanical
products, and the timely use of remote physiological monitoring” to overcome
the limitation of death in combat operations. 41
The normative focus of medical decision-making in COIN, which is
saturated in death despair, inadvertently codified the aspirational ideal of “leave
no man behind” into an expectation that military care providers can, will, and
should save the lives of all injured service members. 42 As such, death despair
has established a multitude of expectations that influence the individual, military
organization, and civilian society. 43 These expectations influence how military
care providers train for, engage in, and return from the performance of casualty
manage. Said differently, the result of hiding death and dying from immediate
view in relationship to both catastrophic injury and casualty management is
multi-fold and is experienced across the deployment cycle. If these expectations
are not uprooted and exposed in order to shift expectations in medical decisionmaking, then death despair will negatively impact the performance of casualty
management in LSCO.
A.

Loss of Expectant Category of Casualty: Individual, Organizational, and
Social Expectations

One major challenge established in the COIN paradigm is the loss of an
expectant category of casualty. 44 The term expectant still exists in training
manuals. 45 However, it is, for all intents and purposes, non-existent in the
practice of casualty management. While many military care providers with
whom I have spoken share similar stories, I rely on evidence provided to me by
an Air Force Critical Care nurse to illustrate my point. She says:
I trained for mass casualty scenarios in which I practiced battlefield triage
exercises. One of these exercise scenarios was developed to allow an injured
warfighter to be placed in the expectant category to die…part of the evaluation
during the exercise was to see if clinicians would place injured warfighters into
the appropriate triage category…The actor playing the injured warfighter

was told it is assumed in the word “expectant casualty.” As I establish in this section, that category
of casualty is no longer practically in play.
41. Combat Casualty Care Research Program (CCCRP), U.S. ARMY MED. RES. & DEV.
COMMAND (June 2019), https://mrdc.amedd.army.mil/index.cfm/program_areas/medical_re
search_and_development/ccc_overview.
42. Charles Bausman, Leave No Man Behind: Implications, Criticisms, and Rationale,
MOUNTAIN TACTICAL INST. (Sept. 2016), https://mtntactical.com/knowledge/leave-no-man-be
hind-implications-criticisms-rationale/.
43. See generally WOOL, supra note 39, at 97–103.
44. See generally MAYHEW, supra note 27, at intro.
45. See generally JESCHKE & HUFFMAN, supra note 28, at 72–73 (2019) (discussing a military
professional’s experience).
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scripted to die, was mistakenly triaged into the immediate category…Operating
as part of the immediate team…I fixated on saving his life using all the best
practices medicine afforded me through higher education and training.
Eventually, after doing everything medically possible to save his life the
warfighter was pronounced dead. After the exercise ended, I discovered the actor
was mis-triaged and was supposed to go to the expectant team. I quickly realized
that I would be validated for providing heroic medical interventions because I
was given an award for my performance in this exercise even though I failed to
achieve the lesson…The real lesson I learned…was that it is not acceptable to
have an expectant triage category …Death in the form of an expectant casualty
became a medical fiction during my deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan…In
practice, the expectant triage category ceased to exist…[all causalities were
managed] with maximum personnel, technical, and aero evacuation support. 46

Without an expectant category of casualty, the COIN paradigm has set up a
patient-centered approach to trauma care in the operational context that seeks to
avoid death at all costs and discounts it as an “unrealistic, unfair, and unprofessional” outcome. 47 As such, this challenge has set up expectations for
individuals (care provider and service member), the military organization, and
the civilian society.
1. Individual Expectations
When thinking about the loss of an expectant category at the individual
level, expectations are created in both the individual military care-provider and
the injured service member. These expectations establish a unique bond between
both parties that creates a focus grounded on the provision of life-saving medical
interventions not mission focus. The individual care provider is currently trained
to embody a heroic identity of combat lifesaver that will do anything and
everything to save an injured service member regardless of cost in resources or
capability. To illustrate my point, I provide a concrete example from the first
time I presented on this topic at Fort Leavenworth. In suggesting that the word
“death” should be integrated into combat casualty care training manuals, a
military care provider strongly asserted that he “did not deal in death. Death was
the domain of chaplains and mortuary affairs.”
In contrast, service members expect that medical resources will always be
present and that military care providers will provide life-saving interventions to
all catastrophically injured service members. At the same conference, an infantry
officer told me that death was not a concern for his service members because
medical resources could and would be provided to the most extreme casualties
ensuring that all injured warfighters would be saved. As he put it, “Only the
enemy dies!” These may seem like extreme scenarios to my readers, as they

46. Id.
47. Hetzler, supra note 35, at 123.
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were shocking to me as a civilian researcher when I first encountered them.
However, through many conversations over the course of the last two years, I
have come to realize that these are commonly held expectations that are enabled
by the loss of the expectant casualty category.
Similarly, the individual morale and willingness of the service member to
fight are linked to life-saving casualty management. As General Peter Chiarelli,
the Army’s former vice chief of staff, said when discussing the importance of
patient-centered care that provides the highest level of medical intervention to
catastrophically injured service members on the battlefield: “I know if I am
providing the kind of combat casualty care that the [warfighter] expect[s] on a
battlefield, every single one of them is going to be so much more [of] a soldier
that is able to accomplish their mission than they would be if I did not.” 48 Said
differently, life-saving interventions are seen to motivate service members to
take on the danger of the battlefield knowing that they will not need to face the
risk of death. As such, military care providers conserve the fighting force by
ensuring morale and motivation to fight.
2. Military Organizational Expectations
General Chiarelli’s comment hints at how loss of the expectant casualty
category also creates expectations for the military organization. In order to
uphold the patient-centered casualty management that does not acknowledge an
expectant casualty category, military leaders have expended tremendous
resources to support the world’s most advanced trauma care system. As such,
the DHA is the third largest source of military spending, averaging over fifty
billion dollars a year. 49 Consequently, the military organization expects that
constructing a patient-centered trauma care system through development of
advanced medical and technological capability will enable the military care
provider to prevent death on any type of battlefield without reference to the
operational context of the battlefield. Similarly, there is a military organizational
expectation that military care providers are trained to negotiate any battlefield
on medical expertise alone without involvement in operational and tactical level
training.
Such expectations have been set up in the military organization because
medical assets have always been available in the COIN paradigm and
catastrophically injured service members have received the highest level of
medical care without consideration of resources. Furthermore, these
organizational expectations have set up a reality where the measure for success
48. DONALD BERWICK ET AL., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., A NATIONAL
TRAUMA CARE SYSTEM: INTEGRATING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SYSTEMS TO ACHIEVE ZERO
PREVENTABLE DEATHS AFTER INJURY 235 (2016).
49. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FY 2020 BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE MILITARY HEALTH
SYSTEM 1 (2019).
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of any given battle is determined by out-of-theater survival rates. Consequently,
death is seen as failure and mission success is associated with “zero deaths” to
such an extent that mission effectiveness is overshadowed by this expectation. 50
In other words, the loss of an expectant casualty category has enabled the
creation of a casualty-averse military culture wherein force health and protection
is singularly focused on avoiding death at all costs.
3. Civilian Society Expectations
Casualty aversion in the military organization and civilian society is a highly
debated topic. While it is not my goal to jump into this debate, I believe this
academic conversation illustrates that the military organization and civilian
society are in a mutually reinforcing relationship that is not dissimilar to the
relationship between the individual military care provider and the service
member. Consequently, literature on casualty aversion in military and civilian
society affirm that death despair implicit in the COIN paradigm also creates
certain expectations in the civilian society. 51 For instance, if a family member
serves in the military and is injured, there is a strong expectation that everything
will be done to save the family member. If the service member is dying, there is
an expectation that the family will be transported to the bedside to say final
goodbyes. Finally, if death does occur, there is an expectation that the body will
be immediately returned home.
More concerning to me when thinking about the loss of the expectant
casualty category is that death despair creates an expectation that civilian society
can be disengaged from the broader conflicts in which the military engages. The
privilege of being able to disconnect from broader national security concerns
produces an expectation that armed conflict comes without cost to civilian
society. 52 This disconnect not only creates a civilian society that is less attendant
to geo-political concerns that impact national security, but also one that does not
participate in the suffering work that is thrust on the few who serve in the
military. In other words, civilians are given what Joan Tronto calls a
“responsibility pass” from being held accountable for the work in which the
military organization engages. 53 As a result, the collective and individual
suffering of those in the military is hidden from view as are the enormous short
and long-term economic costs of health care allocation. 54
50. Lacquement Jr., supra note 11, at 44.
51. See Palazzo, supra note 12, at 66; Jonathan D. Caverley, The Myth of Military Myopia:
Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam, 34 INT’L SEC. 119, 156 (2010); Lacquement Jr., supra note
11, at 43.
52. Lacquement Jr., supra note 11, at 42–43, 52–53.
53. JOAN C. TRONTO, CARING DEMOCRACY: MARKETS, EQUALITY, AND JUSTICE 169–177
(2013).
54. See generally Costs of War, BROWN U., https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/eco
nomic/budget/veterans (last updated Feb. 2015). Since I am not an economic expert, I do not
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As Willie James Jennings argues in his essay “War Bodies: Remembering
Bodies in a Time of War,” civilians engage the military organization from an
abstract distance that reinforces a growing chasm between the service member
and the society served. 55 He says that the civilian society functions by ignoring
the impact of armed conflict through the institutional mechanism of death
despair. 56 This mechanism allows citizens to remain numb to the reality of what
it means to kill and be killed. 57 As one service member said to me: “The civilian
society heroizes us for going into harm’s way for our country but dying—the
thing that used to make us noble—is the very thing we are not allowed to do.”
Furthermore, the pain and suffering that comes with catastrophic battlefield
injury disappears from the collective civilian social consciousness. 58 In
response, civilian society glosses over the military organization and individual
service members with a dedication to a form of hyper-patriotism that is obsessed
with the wounded or heroic service member. 59
B.

LSCO Paradigm: Reserve Triage

Having discussed some of the expectations—individual, military
organization, and civilian society—that are established by the loss of an
expectant category of casualty in the COIN paradigm, I want to briefly explore
how these expectations might be problematic when considering the reality of
LSCO on a multi-domain battlefield. As stated in the introduction, military
medical experts are projecting an entirely different mass casualty scenario. A
mass casualty is defined in a medical situation as occurring when the number
and severity of casualties overwhelm the available resources. 60 It is not that mass
casualties did not exist in COIN. However, the military context was defined by
directly address the enormous monetary cost associated with the human carnage that has occurred
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Projections have indicated that the long-term cost of care for disabled
veterans is in excess of $600 billion. This is supported by Linda Bilmes’ and Joseph Stiglitz’s work
The Three Trillion Dollar War, which was published in 2008. Since then, this estimate has been
surpassed, and Linda Bilmes has suggested the cost of care for veterans is as high as $1 trillion.
Linda J. Bilmes, Current and Protected Future Costs of Caring for Veterans of the Iraq and
Afghanistan Wars 1 (Harv. Kennedy Sch. Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus. & Gov’t, Working
Paper No. 2011-06, 2011). My simple point is that there are heavy economic costs to death despair
that have not been evaluated in the short-term allocation of medical resources or the long-term
allocation of resources for health care. More importantly, these costs are hidden from immediate
view and discussion in the civilian society.
55. Willie James Jennings, War Bodies: Remembering Bodies in a Time of War, in POSTTRAUMATIC PUBLIC THEOLOGY 23–25 (Stephanie N. Arel et al. eds., 2016).
56. See generally id. at 23–28.
57. Id.
58. See MAYHEW, supra note 27, at intro. See also WOOL, supra note 39, at 97–103.
59. See Jennings, supra note 55, at 21.
60. WHO, MASS CASUALTY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 6 (2007), https://www.who.int/hac/
techguidance/MCM_inside_Jul07.pdf.
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a resource rich environment. In contrast, LSCO will be defined by a resource
constrained environment whereby the volume of casualties will increase while
the amount of medical resources will decrease.
Preparing for large-scale casualty estimates, lack of air superiority, limited
or no casualty evacuation, and complicated civil–military interaction is
necessary in the face of LSCO. 61 Expected systematic denial of services means
limitations in resupply, communication, control, and continuity of care. 62
Intangible effects of legal, social, financial, and media warfare will further
complicate actions. Although absent in combat operations for almost a century,
nonpermissive environments and uncontrolled engagements will have affects
that cannot be denied. 63 The medical reality of such an operational environment
will be that military care providers will have scarce resources far forward on the
battlefield, no medical infrastructure in country, and limited to no casualty
evacuation. 64 As such, the continuity of care that enabled the COIN paradigm
will not exist in LSCO making it impossible to medically stabilize and maintain
catastrophically injured service members. 65 Furthermore, it is likely that tactical
necessity will restrict medical access, govern distribution of scarce medical
resources, and compel reverse triage. 66 Under these circumstances, not only will
catastrophically injured service members die, but there will also a thousand-fold
increase in the number of causalities that must be attended to in a LSCO
paradigm. 67
When thinking about a LSCO paradigm, the expectant casualty category
cannot be hidden behind medical technology and infrastructure. It will not only
be a ubiquitous reality, but it will also guide military care providers’ medical
decision-making. In other words, military care providers will be forced to shift
their medical decision-making from a singular focus on life-saving care to triage.
The latter form of decision-making includes an assessment not only of who will
live, but also who will die, and implies some form of death-care. “Having forged
an expectation that life-saving medical care” can and “will be provided to all”
injured service members, “failure to provide medical care is likely to provoke
fear” in individuals (service members and military care providers), “the military
organization, and civilian society alike even if it is militarily necessary.”68

61. See Perkins, Preparing for the Fight Tonight, supra note 13, at 6–12.
62. See JESCHKE & HUFFMAN, supra note 28, at 76.
63. Michael Lundy et al., Feeding the Forge: Sustaining Large-Scale Combat Operations,
U.S. ARMY (July 18, 2019), https://www.army.mil/article/223833/feeding_the_forge_sustaining_
large_scale_combat_operations.
64. Hetzler, supra note 35, at 123.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 123–124.
67. JESCHKE & HUFFMAN, supra note 28, at 76.
68. Id. at 69.
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1. Shifting Expectations from COIN to LSCO: Individual
The loss of the expectant category of casualty is an enormous challenge at
the individual level when thinking about the nature of LSCO. If at least two
generations of service member have become habituated to the idea that they are
inoculated against death with the help of life-saving casualty management—as
it seems they are—then countering death despair will likely provoke extreme
fear in both the military care provider and service member alike making them
both combat ineffective if these expectations are not shifted. 69
Expectations that gave rise to the loss of an expectant casualty category have
also given rise to a loss of medical decision-making that focuses on mission over
individual—a skill that will be necessary to perform operational triage in
LSCO. 70 Shifting expectations in the individual military care provider presents
at least two obstacles. First, when life-saving care is provided regardless of the
condition of catastrophic injury, the military care provider’s ability to discern
medical futility atrophies. 71 The cognitive ability to assess futility is a necessary
component of effective triage. 72 Second, having forged a military identity in care
providers that is defined by life-saving skills, accepting death as a realistic
outcome of catastrophic injury places the identity of the military care provider
at risk. 73 In other words, the damage control paradigm has habituated military
care providers not only to see themselves as lifesavers, but in so doing, to also
instinctually respond to the level of damage to the service member’s body
without thought for the military mission. If these expectations are not shifted,
the ability of the care provider to place the mission above the injured service
member will be compromised and could put the mission at risk.
Similarly, if individual service members are expecting that military care
providers can and will do everything in the face of catastrophic injury, they may
not be able to face the extreme reality of mass casualties in LSCO, which would
greatly impede the performance of individual service members. Recently, I was
discussing the topic of death despair with an infantry officer. He was intrigued
and believed that any discussion of death would hinder the morale of his
company. In justifying his position, the officer told me two separate stories.
First, he explained that he had constructed a standard operating procedure (SOP)
for his company to use in Afghanistan. Chapter Nine of this SOP was dedicated
to defining the procedures necessary for dealing with a fatal casualty. When he
handed out the manual to those service members under his command, the officer
excluded Chapter Nine on the notion that it would distract from the fight. In
illustrating the importance of avoiding any focus on death, this officer provided
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See generally id. at 72–76.
JESCHKE & HUFFMAN, supra note 28, at 75–76.
Id. at 75.
Falzone et al., supra note 27, at 43–44.
JESCHKE & HUFFMAN, supra note 28, at 75.
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an example. He explained that in training exercises, one young service member
became distracted by every casualty. In response to a casualty, the service
member would stop and attend to the casualty instead of returning fire, which
caused five other service members to eventually “die” in the training exercise.
The officer thought the training outcome was the result of service member’s
focus on injury, which would be worse if this service member had been explicitly
trained to prepare for death. My interpretation of this scenario was not that
introducing the possibility of death distracts, but that death despair distracts. In
other words, the young service member’s lack of familiarity with death caused
him to be distracted and attend to the injured service member and not the fight
in which he was engaged. Placing the mission over the life of a fellow injured
service member is something that must be trained for and integrated into the
decision-making capacity of the soldier. As such, both military and medical
decision-making need to include the reality of death and dying at the individual
level in order to shift to the appropriate type of decision-making that will support
mission success in the face of mass casualties on a multi-domain battlefield.
2. Shifting Expectations from COIN to LSCO: Military Organization
The previous illustration is interconnected with the challenge of shifting
expectations at the military organization level. In arguing that the military
organizational culture is casualty averse, Richard Lacquement’s provides a
concrete example illustrating how death despair can impact mission success. 74
He says that: “An important cost of this approach was the failure to capture or
destroy large numbers of al-Qa’ida and Taliban forces—and possibly Osama
Bin Laden himself—during the Tora Bora fight of December 2001.” 75 More
noteworthy is that Lacquement argues that this death despair is a life-force that
manifests not only in casualty aversion but also risk aversion across the entire
military organization. 76 He presents the idea that force protection not mission
success has become the military’s priority. 77 Relying on Brigadier General
Daniel Kaufman, Lacquement suggests that officers do not have the ability to
exercise judgement that takes into consideration the context of the battlefield
and act in accordance with the mission. 78 Acceptance of injury has become
conflated with recklessly putting service members in harm’s way. 79 Such a
conflation also confuses the strategic implications of catastrophic injury with the
tactical implications of catastrophic injury. Said differently, when those engaged
in the fight are worried about the political implications of service members’

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Lacquement Jr., supra note 11, at 45.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 46.
Lacquement Jr., supra note 11, at 47.
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dying their decision-making is hampered by not prioritizing the immediate needs
of the mission. When a military organization becomes sheepish about harm to
individual service members and unwilling to accept catastrophic injury, a riskaverse military culture is fostered. 80 Within such a culture, death despair causes
service members at all ranks across the organization to ignore the reality that
harm is implicit in the nature of military operations. 81
When considering the mass casualty scenarios projected in LSCO, the
military organization would collapse if it remained focused on individual
catastrophic injury and hesitated to respond in accordance with the mission’s
objectives. 82 The resources demanded by the COIN paradigm will not only be
absent, but the entire logistical structure of the U.S. military will be ill-prepared
for the reality of mass casualties. 83 Consider, for instance, the removal of bodies
from the battlefield alone. If there is no casualty evacuation there will also be no
infrastructure to remove dead or catastrophically injured service members from
the battlefield. Furthermore, there is no longer a grave’s registration system large
enough to support the needs of extreme mass casualty scenarios. 84 As such, if
expectations created by death despair across the military organization are not
shifted, it will be hard to plan for the logistical and strategic implications of mass
casualties other than in the abstract, which could greatly impact the ability of the
military to fight as well as societal support for combat operations.
3. Shifting Expectations from COIN to LSCO: Civilian Society
At a civilian level, death despair has hidden the reality of catastrophicallyinjured service members from view. The expectations that come with the loss of
an expectant casualty category means that the civilian society does not to
participate in suffering that is inherent in armed conflict. Moreover, the civilian
society does not participate in the day-to-day healing from the experiences of
armed conflict. The collective social responsibility for military engagement
becomes a free-floating form of responsibility that is expressed in a public
performance of a patriotic master narrative that does not attend to the day to day
experience of returning injured service members or military care providers. In
this political narrative, civilian society supports service members through
appreciation and concern for the painful work that is performed by those who
have deployed in support of our national security interests. However, this
pathos-inducing narrative thwarts the grief and healing work of individual
service members as they attempt to make meaning from their military

80. Id.
81. Id. at 45–47.
82. See generally id. at 47.
83. See generally JESCHKE & HUFFMAN, supra note 28, at 74.
84. MICHAEL SLEDGE, SOLDIER DEAD: HOW WE RECOVER, IDENTIFY, BURY, AND HONOR
OUR MILITARY FALLEN 60 (2005).
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experiences. 85 Meaning is provided by the national identity that has been
inscribed through the valorization of a wounded warrior or the heroic military
care provider, not the nuanced and complex layers of pain that must be processed
when dealing with the rehabilitation and reintegration process. 86
If the expectations that have engendered a civilian society with lack of
awareness of the military organization and individual service member are not
addressed, the lack of public support for any engagement in LSCO could be
undermined. Even if the public were to support involvement in LSCO with a
near-peer enemy, the expectations of being flown to the bedside for final
goodbyes or having the body returned stateside would be sharp blows to the
collective consciousness of the civilian society. The numbness that is induced
by death despair would likely invoke deep social melancholia when confronted
with mass casualty scenarios that could create further divisions between the
individual service members, the military organization, and the civilian society
they serve in support of national security.
4. Diagram of Broad Scope of Challenges
As you are starting to see, the complex challenge of shifting expectations
around death and dying is a behemoth. In order to give shape to my thoughts, I
constructed a visual diagram that outlines various aspects of what needs to be
identified and articulated in order to begin the project of building a more
comprehensive conceptual map that can manage the organizational change that
comes with shifting expectations.

85. Jennings, supra note 55, at 23, 25–26.
86. See MAYHEW, supra note 27, at 139. See also WOOL, supra note 39, at 99–130. See
generally Corey S. Powell, War Without Death, DISCOVER MAG. (Apr. 1, 1999), https://www.dis
covermagazine.com/technology/war-without-death (discussing newer inventions in nonlethal
weaponry).
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Diagram One
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The diagram includes the entire deployment cycle. To indicate that there are
ethical and practical expectations attendant to each phase of deployment, I have
included terminology from both the just war tradition and force health
protection. Each dark black rectangle represents one broad challenge that has
multiple attendant expectations that will need to be identified and articulated for
the individual, military, and society both COIN and LSCO. Thick solid black
lines outlining broad challenges symbolize the idea that the challenge has not
been articulated. Dotted lines symbolize the idea that the phases of expectation
naturally influence each other. Smaller rectangles inside the challenge represent
expectations that need to be identified. Those that appear in shades of grey
represent implicit expectations that have been formed by the COIN paradigm.
Those that appear in white represent a new LSCO paradigm. Thin solid lines
separating COIN from LSCO symbolize the idea that there is currently no
articulated means of managing a shift in expectation from COIN to LSCO so
there can be no influence between the two categories of expectation. Once the
component parts of the diagram begin to be filled, this information can serve as
the basis from which to develop training to manage the shift from medical
decision-making in COIN to LSCO.
This diagram can also serve as a starting point for outlining research that
aims to develop a comprehensive conceptual map managing strategic
organizational change around death despair. In order to specify what type of
research is needed to fill out the component parts, I turn next to discuss why it
is important that academic experts in anthropology, history, and political science
lead interdisciplinary teams who collaborate with military medical and strategic
experts.
III. DAMAGE CONTROL INTERDISCIPLINARITY: WORKING WITH DEATH
DESPAIR
Having established that death despair is implicitly woven into the
expectations that ground medical decision-making in the COIN paradigm, the
question is now how to construct a comprehensive conceptual map for managing
expectations that need to shift around death and dying to prepare for a LSCO
paradigm. In justifying the importance of academic interdisciplinary teams that
are external to the military organization but intimately collaborate with military
medical and strategic experts, I turn to literature in organizational behavior. This
research highlights why it is important to strategically think about shifting
expectations as a second-order organizational change. Thereafter, I suggest why
external, interdisciplinary academic teams need to lead the research process.
Finally, I highlight which aspects of the research will be assigned to each party
in the interdisciplinary team.
While these insights might seem obvious to you, as they did to me, I have
come to learn that it is not without contention that academics engage in applied
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policy and program development. 87 In contrast, it is not without contention that
academic outsiders are viewed as ineffective when attempting to use highly
specialized research methodologies to inform national security policy. 88 My
basic point in this section is that different groups of academics have theoretical
expertise while certain other groups of professionals have practical expertise.
Both theoretical and practical wisdom are necessary in creating a rich base of
evidence from which effective and informed training and policy can be
developed. In this section, I show how the academic and practical worlds of
knowledge should work together in specific ways to resolve the complex
challenge of death despair that confronts national security. To establish this
point, I turn to explain why it is important that external academics lead such
research.
A.

Strategic Organizational Change: Systems Theory and Groupthink

Systems theory research seeks to understand how organizations interact with
the environment in which they operate. 89 To do so, this theory researches
organizations as systems that function like living organisms. 90 Large
organizations, such as the military, are composed of complex layers of
subsystems. One example is military medicine. These subsystems coordinate
well with each and the larger organization enabling optimal performance due to
cognitive schema that provide both shared meaning and frames of reference for
tasks. 91 Cognitive schemata are developed over time through individual and
group choices that are motivated by the larger organizational mission. 92 The
construction of cognitive schema comes through first-order organizational
change allows for consistency, continuity, and cohesion of organizational
behavior by providing an implicit framework of meaning against which
individuals within an organizational subsystem orient their action toward a

87. MICHAEL C. DESCH, CULT OF THE IRRELEVANT: THE WANING INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 2 (2019).
88. See Paul C. Avey & Michael C. Desch, What Do Policymakers Want from Us? Results of
a Survey of Current and Former Senior National Security Decision Makers, 58 INT’L STUD. Q.
227, 243–45 (2014).
89. See Charissa P. Cordon, System Theories: An Overview of Various System Theories and
Its Application in Healthcare, 2 AM. J. SYS. SCI. 13, 14 (2013).
90. Cornell C. Chikere & Jude Nwoka, The Systems Theory of Management in Modern Day
Organizations: A Study of Aldgate Congress Resort Limited Port Harcourt, 5 INT’L J. SCI. & RES.
PUBLICATIONS 1, 1 (2015); Cordon, supra note 89, at 16–19; Francis Amagoh, Perspectives on
Organizational Change: Systems and Complexity Theories, 13 INNOVATION J.: PUB. SECTOR
INNOVATION J. 1, 2–3 (2008).
91. See Jean M. Bartunek & Michael K. Moch, First-Order, Second-Order, and Third-Order
Change and Organization Development Interventions: A Cognitive Approach, 23 J. APPLIED
BEHAV. SCI. 483, 485–86 (1987).
92. Id. at 484–86.
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common interpretation of and response to shared events. 93 As such, first-order
change forms an implicit web of meaning relative to cultural norms, practices,
judgements, and values of the organization. 94 In achieving effective
organizational performance, first-order change is meant to tacitly reinforce the
present state of organizational behavior through reinforcement of implicit
organizational culture. 95 As such, first-order change developed a military
organizational system and medical subsystem that are inherently saturated in
death despair. More specifically, first-order change enabled the development of
the COIN paradigm which implicitly orients medical decision-making
exclusively around life-saving interventions.
As mentioned in my introduction, major shifts are occurring in military
medicine. Along with the shift in types of future conflicts, DHA is changing how
medicine is performed both in the deployment and garrison environments. 96
These major changes create an inherently unstable situation as periods of
transition are inherently volatile. Major shifts in a subsystem, if poorly managed,
cause disruption across the entire organization because the larger organization
self-regulates to maintain the status quo causing organizational friction and
eventual break down. Consequently, unmanaged organizational change causes
severe unintentional consequences that negatively impact the performance of
individuals and the entire organization. 97 For this reason, second-order change
management focuses on strategically shifting organizational behavior by
attempting to modify the present cognitive schema toward a new strategic goal. 98
Second-order change management achieves two tasks: first, excavating the
meanings implicit in cognitive schemas, and second, articulating new strategic
goals against which change is directed. 99 Third-order change is the actual
development and implementation of training based on strategic planning that
occurs in the second-order change management process. 100 The goal of such
training is two-fold. First, to make individuals aware of the present schema
regulating their actions. 101 Second, to provide pathways that expand the original
cognitive schema to support new interpretations of and responses to events that

93. Id. at 484.
94. Id. at 485–86.
95. Id. at 486.
96. See Quay Drawdy, Changes Coming to a Medical Group Near You, MAXWELL AIR FORCE
BASE (April 15, 2019), https://www.maxwell.af.mil/News/Display/Article/1814702/changes-com
ing-to-a-medical-group-near-you/.
97. See generally Sunday Abayomi Adebisi et al., System Theory and Effective Performance
in a Changing Environment: A Post-Mortem Study of Nigeria Public Establishment, 6 UNILAG J.
HUMAN. 77–99 (2018).
98. Bartunek & Moch, supra note 91, at 486.
99. See id. at 486–88, 495.
100. See id. at 486.
101. See id. at 488.
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support the expanded organizational mission. 102 Obviously, in this article the
topic of concern is enhancing cognitive schema to include death and dying as a
medical reality of LSCO.
When considering who is best suited to lead an interdisciplinary research
team that develops a comprehensive conceptual map of second-order change
management that lays the foundation for third-order organizational change, it
might seem natural to suggest that those most experienced in the subsystem or
the larger organization ought to be at the helm, i.e. military strategic or medical
experts. However, the difficulty of successfully implementing radical strategic
change in any organization using professionals who are internal to a system or
subsystem, is that those who are familiar with the current organizational
behavior tend toward the following three behaviors: defensiveness, 103
groupthink, 104 and strategic drift. 105 These behaviors reinforce the current
cognitive schemas and organizational behavior. 106 Furthermore, it is difficult for
those within an organization to speak truth to power when it comes to necessary
change because their jobs are dependent on the approval of their superiors. 107
This is amplified in a military organization where rank structure implies certain
levels of organizational power. The practical result of these factors is that when
those internal to an organization attempt to lead its strategic change, the output
of the research becomes reproduction of the old organizational cognitive
schemas and practices. 108
Therefore, I have suggested that the interdisciplinary team be led by external
academic experts who intimately collaborate with military medical and strategic
experts to reduce the likelihood of reproduction of the same organizational
behavior. Academic experts from different disciplines will reduce the likelihood
of groupthink because each discipline is formed according to a different set of
102. See id. at 495–96.
103. See CHRIS ARGYRIS, STRATEGY, CHANGE AND DEFENSIVE ROUTINES 5–6 (1985).
104. See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS
AND FIASCOES 7–10 (2d ed. 1982).
105. See GERRY JOHNSON, STRATEGIC CHANGE AND THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS 244–47
(1987).
106. See A.B. (Rami) Shani & Jean-Francois Coget, Instructor’s Manual: Behavior in
Organizations: An Experimental Approach, CAL. POLYTECHNIC ST. U., https://www.cob.calpoly.
edu/behavior-in-organizations/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2017/06/Instructor-manual.pdf (last
visited Jan. 5, 2020). See also Maria R. Shirey, Group Think, Organizational Strategy, and Change,
42 J. NURSING ADMIN. 67, 67–69 (2012); Tanya Sammut-Bonnici, Strategic Drift,
RESEARCHGATE (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272184191_Strategic
_Drift.
107. See generally James R. Detert, Cultivating Everyday Courage, 2018 HARV. BUS. REV.
128–135.
108. See generally Paul Schoemaker, Why Thinking Outside-In Is Your Key to Success, INC.
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.inc.com/paul-schoemaker/why-outside-in-thinking-is-your-key-tosuccess.html.
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epistemological assumptions about research and valid formulation of
knowledge. 109 In other words, each discipline is based on a worldview different
from each other and the military organization. Additionally, external experts will
be more resistant to the influence of power structures implicit in the military
organizational hierarchy. Academic experts from multiple disciplines will enter
the research project not only with different grounding assumptions relative to
their specialized research method, but also different tools to achieve the task at
hand. As such, having the research team led by external academics will not only
help mitigate the opportunity for self-referential outcomes, but also provide a
more comprehensive conceptual map.
B.

Interdisciplinary Team Composition

The aims that ground interdisciplinary research on second-order
organizational change will focus on describing the following: how death despair
is operant in the current COIN casualty management paradigm, what the nature
of catastrophic injury will be on the future multi-domain battlefield, and how
mass casualty scenarios will impact mission effectiveness in LSCO. To
complete this comprehensive conceptual map, three academic disciplines and
two groups of military experts should compose the interdisciplinary team. The
tools necessary to perform the two aims can be found in the academic disciplines
of anthropology, history, and political science. The third is best achieved by
integrating military medical and strategic experts.
C. External Academic Leads: Anthropology, History, and Political Science
To place these tasks on my visual diagram, I turn first to the grey rectangles
at the individual and military organizational level. When thinking about the
current expectations established in COIN casualty management, applied
anthropology serves as the best research discipline to complete these boxes.
Academic anthropology has a checkered when considering this disciplines
involvement in policy science and national security. It can boast of both
noteworthy successes and failures. Currently, academic anthropology is hesitant
to engage in applied work because it moves beyond the theoretical purity of the
discipline especially in relationship to questions of national security. 110
Interestingly, corporations have begun to see the valuable asset applied
anthropology brings to corporate success. 111 Anthropologists help corporate

109. Machiel Keestra, Metacognition and Reflection by Interdisciplinary Experts: Insights from
Cognitive Science and Philosophy, 35 ISSUES INTERDISC. STUD. 121, 124, 148 (2017).
110. See Thomas Weaver, Anthropology as a Policy Science: Part I, A Critique, 44 HUM. ORG.
97, 101 (1985).
111. See also Corporate Anthropology: Michael Henderson at TEDxAuckland,
TEDXAUCKLAND (2009), https://tedxauckland.com/people/michael-henderson/. See generally
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executives better understand both the end-users of their product or service and
create meaningful corporate policy by understanding corporate culture from a
bottom-up manner. 112 Developing corporate culture and policy that are informed
by those at the ground level has proven effective in increasing both job
performance and better corporate outcomes. 113
Applied anthropology brings tools to excavate beliefs, assumptions,
practices, symbols, meanings, and interactions implicit in any given
organizational culture. 114 Moreover, this discipline provides various modes of
analysis that can shine light on how specific subcultures interact to form implicit
cognitive schema that operate within an overarching organizational culture in
subsystems. 115 As Jarrett Zigon points out, anthropology critically evaluates the
ordinary practices to understand how these practices form and are formed by
political agendas attendant to a particular organizational culture by looking for
embedded categories where tactic agreement exist and give implicit meaning to
notions of: “intention, responsibility, and reasons for action; the exercise of
practical judgement; the forms of sustained attention and labor subsumed under
the concept or practice of ‘care.’” 116 Therefore, anthropology is suited not only
to reveal the cultural genealogy of implicit cognitive schema around death
despair in the COIN paradigm, but also to “reveal their potentially (not so)
hidden political‐economic implications.” 117 Because the discipline is interested
in humans and human interaction, anthropology will also be critical to
negotiations among various different stakeholders and the agenda of an
interdisciplinary research team.
Next, I turn to the white rectangles at the individual and military
organizational level. When thinking about a new LSCO paradigm, history serves
as the best academic discipline to identify and articulate which battlefields of the
past produced extreme mass casualty scenarios akin to those scenarios being
discussed in LSCO. Again, academic historians debate whether or not history
should be applied to the future in order to learn lessons from the past. Unlike
anthropology, the use of applied history to national security concerns is not a
novel concept. Lacquement carefully articulates the important role history plays

Mike Walsh, The CEOs of the Future Will Need to be Anthropologists, as well as Technologists,
YOUTUBE (June 23, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hALidEdpdMM.
112. Id.
113. See generally Corporate Anthropology: Michael Henderson at TEDxAuckland supra note
111.
114. See id.
115. See id.; Taysir M. Khatib, Organizational Culture, Subcultures, and Organizational
Commitment (1996) (published Ph.D. dissertation, Iowa State University).
116. Jarrett Zigon, An Ethics of Dwelling and a Politics of World-Building: A Critical Response
to Ordinary Ethics, 20 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 746, 747–750 (2014).
117. Id. at 747.
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in analogic reasoning. 118 In arguing that historical cases can provide a useful
foundation for helping identify and articulate national security concerns,
Lacquement suggests that historical data help to establish general patterns that
aid in clarifying future contexts. 119 This contextual information can help military
strategists to hypothesize about subsequent choices. However, Lacquement also
clearly articulates the limits of historical case analysis when preparing for future
national security concerns. 120 He says that history ought not to be seen as a
comprehensive guide to predict future action. 121 He warns that it is important to
be nuanced in the application of historical cases to future context because there
will be many important differences between the past and the future. 122 Being
overly literal in the application of historical data to future scenarios could be
detrimental to the actual overall objective of training good decision-making. As
Lacquement points out, military strategists have, at times, had the tendency to
use historical analysis as a way to control the future. 123
Historical cases used as analogs to a LSCO multi-domain battlefield work
well for this project because the conceptual map needs to be comprehensive, not
an exact or literal replication. As you will recall, the interdisciplinary map is
serving as the foundation for a metaphorical damage control manual that will
guide training and policy. Academic historians are nuanced in their thinking
through case analysis. Therefore, they are essential in helping articulate limits
of understanding when extrapolating future commonalities from historical cases.
For this reason, I suggest that academic historians engage in excavating the
various historical cases before military medical and strategic experts enter the
conversation. Moreover, Lacquement points out that historical cases, when
appropriately used in training, serve as a useful psychological preparation for
service members. 124 He says that historical cases allow individuals to confront
the unknown by evaluating patterns from the past to hypothesize about various
decision-making options and weigh the benefits and burdens of those options. 125
This process enables military decision makers to “develop sound discretionary
judgment.” 126 As such, the discipline of history is critical not only because it has
the tools to access and assess necessary data central to the development of a
comprehensive conceptual map, but also because the outputs historians provide
are of central concern to this project, namely preparing military care providers
for medical decision-making in a LSCO paradigm.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Lacquement Jr., supra note 11, at 59.
Id. at 60–61.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id.
Lacquement Jr., supra note 11, at 67.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id. at 60.
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Finally, I turn to the grey and white rectangles at the civilian society level.
Deploying military assets to achieve certain political goals requires not only
articulating the implications of achieving those goals—mass casualty
projections of LSCO—but also understanding the civilian society’s readiness
and willingness to support those stated political goals. The debate on casualty
aversion referenced above suggests that it is unclear whether civilian society
would support a higher number of casualties in support of LSCO. Furthermore,
it suggests that civilian society’s current level of support for military fatality
rates is unknown. What is known is that the COIN paradigm has established
expectations relative to catastrophic injury that need to be shifted in order to
prepare for a LSCO paradigm. I suggest that the best discipline to articulate the
civilian society’s current and future expectations on death and dying in support
of national defense is political science. Since war is one instrument of political
power, political science a central discipline in national security studies. 127 More
importantly, political science specializes in understanding how political
decision-making impacts and is impacted by social expectations. 128
While political science seems like a natural disciplinary fit for constructing
present and future social expectations of relative to catastrophic combat injury,
the use of political science for the purposes of polling public opinion is not
without contention. 129 At a recent conference on Armed Forces and Society,
Timo Graf argued that political science research has not been invested in
exploring the public opinion in relationship to the changing security
environment with Russia and China. 130 His basic point was that if academics in
political science ignore public opinion, then it could thwart the construction of
nuanced defense policy, undermine the legitimacy of the military organization,
and impede national security. 131 His presentation not only established that the
academic discipline has the tools to query, aggregate, articulate and analyze the
social expectations both current and future, in expectation on death and dying in
relationship to military operations, but also that including the expectations of
civilian society when thinking about LSCO is critical. 132

127. See generally BERTAND BADIE, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
2541 (2011).
128. See generally Stuart Soroka & Christopher Wlezien, Public Opinion and Public Policy, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CANADIAN POLITICS 1–4 (John C. Courtney & David E. Smith eds., 2010)
(discussing the impacts of public opinion on policies).
129. Joshua D. Kertzer & Thomas Zeitzoff, A Bottom-Up Theory of Public Opinion About
Foreign Policy, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 543, 554 (2017).
130. See generally Timo Alexander Graf, Unity in the Face of Threat? Exploring the Empirical
Relationship Between Strategic Threat Perceptions and Public Support for a Common European
Army in Germany, 29 EUR. SEC. 55 (2020).
131. Id. at 56.
132. See generally id. at 55–73.
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While the more practical applied aspects of public opinion polling may seem
messy for the typical political science academic, they are essential to this project
because they possess the richest theoretical knowledge on public opinion,
representation and willingness to support national and international policy. 133
As such, political scientists have the most refined understanding of how best to
assess the civilian society’s current and future expectations on death and dying
as a result of military operations.
1. Military Medical and Strategic Experts
Since academic anthropologists, historians, and political scientists are not
necessarily intimately familiar with the details of national security as it relates
to medicine on the battlefield, it will be critical that interdisciplinary academics
also intimately collaborate with their military counterparts. To do so, the
interdisciplinary team will need to heavily rely on military medical and strategic
experts at the beginning and end of this process. At the beginning, military
medical and strategic experts will be essential to help refine research aims as
well as the research process. In the middle, the bulk of the data collection and
analysis process will be led and performed by academic experts. At the end,
military medical and strategic experts will be essential to the consolidation of
data into a comprehensive conceptual map.
What I originally took to be an innocuous proposal, I know realize is a
radical idea. The biggest challenge in constructing an interdisciplinary research
team to investigate death despair in military medicine may not only be the topic
of death, but also disciplinary boundaries that allow academics to remain safe
within its specialized notions of academic validity and rigor. Some of the biggest
hurdles of interdisciplinary research are terms of art and linguistic tricks that
keep academic disciplines pure and focused internally on self-referential work
in the academy. While internal coherence is necessary on some level, it can
impede participation in the translation and implementation work necessary to
construct effective and informed policy and training development. 134 If it is
possible to overcome various disciplinary and military skepticism and work
together, I believe such an interdisciplinary team could provide an enormously
helpful comprehensive conceptual map that illustrates the broad scope of
challenges related to shifting expectations from those that exist in the COIN
paradigm to those that must exist in a LSCO paradigm. As such, interdisciplinary
damage control could serve as an antidote to death despair in military medicine.
IV. CONCLUSION: DEATH DESPAIR PRESENT AND FUTURE
In this article, I developed a modest argument suggesting that to effectively
shift expectations relative to death and dying in casualty management, the DHA
133. See generally Soroka & Wlezien, supra note 128, at 2–4.
134. See JANIS, supra note 104, at 7–9.
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needs to support interdisciplinary research that focuses on strategic second-order
organizational change before developing health policy and medical training for
LSCO. Specifically, I suggested that this interdisciplinary team needs to be led
by academic experts in anthropology, history, and political science in
collaboration with military medical and strategic experts. In bringing to light the
problem of death despair, I hope I have achieved my professional goals of
presenting critical questions about the normative focus on life-saving medical
interventions in military casualty management. I also hope my argument
achieved the task of providing a valuable way to scope to this problem, as well
as guided my intended audience to appropriate experts and methods to best
research how to shift expectations around death and dying in military medicine.
While it is important to articulate a comprehensive conceptual map that
outlines what is needed to address death despair in casualty management, it is
not enough to be properly prepared for the future multi-domain battlefield in
LSCO. Using this information, third-order organizational change management
in the form of military training will need to be developed to properly prepare
military care providers for medical decision-making in a LSCO paradigm. As
obvious as it may sound, none of this can happen without the support of national
and international civilian and military leaders who understand the central role
military medicine plays in national security. Until it is made clear how medical
decision-making has an incredible impact on the effectiveness of military
operations, it will be hard to justify the importance of the research outlined in
this article. However, to ignore the importance of this topic, is also to leave our
military care providers unprepared to truly conserve the fighting force, which
places undue stress on the military organization and puts national security at
risk.
You will note that I have not included economists and lawyers in the
development of this comprehensive conceptual map. While I believe these
disciplines are essential to my broader project of constructing a set of
interlocking arguments for why military medicine needs to be at the national and
international strategic planning table, they are not central to shifting expectations
in medical decision-making—the topic of concern in this article. In the second
phase of this project, economists and lawyers will be essential in determining
how to conceptually frame the question of how to best conceptualize military
and medical resource allocation on the future multi-domain battlefield.
To conclude, I will gesture to why death despair is an important topic to me
as an ethicist. Recently, I have started to explore social psychological research
on Terror Management Theory. In short, this theory studies death despair
through the construct of thanatophobia—the fear of death. 135 The goal is to
better understand how human beings react when confronted with human
135. Psychology Today, Terror Management Theory, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/
basics/terror-management-theory (last visited Dec. 31, 2019).
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mortality. 136 Empirical evidence strongly suggests that individuals seek to
affirm their heroic identity by forming small in-groups that give allegiance to a
rigid authoritarian leadership. 137 When thinking about the extreme mass casualty
scenarios anticipated in LSCO, I worry that death despair in military medicine
creates a situation that is rife for war crimes. This is especially true, when
considering the heroic combat life-saver identity that has been forged in our
military care providers. If clinicians are unprepared to confront death, it could
not only cause operational ineffectiveness, but also a strong desire to reinforce
this heroic identity. 138 To avoid rigid adherence to a heroic identity and
authoritarian leadership, Terror Management Theory suggests that individuals
need to develop a thick relationship with death. 139 Though still inchoate in my
thinking, Terror Management Theory suggests to me that shifting expectations
in casualty management from death despair to death acceptance is not only
practically important to support mission effectiveness, but also ethically
important to fight justly in LSCO.
As I ponder on the current state of death despair in military medicine, I am
also personally concerned with the hidden long-term costs of the COIN
paradigm. In fact, I wonder if death despair is not a pathway for diseases of
despair, a construct defined by pre-mature death due to suicide, substance abuse,
or alcoholic liver damage. It is hard to ignore the fact that military care providers
and catastrophically injured service members are at a high risk for all three. 140
This is made more poignant when reflecting the financial cost of continued care
for catastrophic injuries placed on society. Often, the severely injured come
home to die not directly at the hands of the enemy, but from drug overdose,
alcoholism, or suicide. 141
In contrast to literature that place the pathway at economic stagnation, I have
mused on whether unsanctioned and unprocessed grief is not a more accurate
pathway to diseases of despair in the military. When death despair dominates
the military worldview, the on-going and never-ending losses that military care
providers are exposed to are also hidden from view. Likewise, the losses
136. Id.
137. See Jeff Greenberg et al., Terror Management Theory of Self-Esteem and Cultural
Worldviews: Empirical Assessments and Conceptual Refinements, 29 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 61, 65, 92 (1997).
138. See JESCHKE & HUFFMAN, supra note 28, at 72–74.
139. See id.
140. See generally OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH & SUICIDE PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, NATIONAL VETERAN SUICIDE PREVENTION ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2019)
(discussing rates of suicide amongst veterans); Karen H. Seal et al., Substance Use Disorders in
Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans in VA Healthcare, 2001-2010: Implications for Screening,
Diagnosis and Treatment, 116 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 93, 97 (2011) (discussing the
prevalence of substance use disorders, including both alcohol and drugs).
141. Seal et al., supra note 140, at 97; OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH & SUICIDE PREVENTION,
supra note 140, at 9.
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experienced by catastrophically injured service members whose lives were
saved are hidden from view. Grief becomes unsanctioned by the individual who
sees it as failure, the organization who sees it as inefficient, and the society who
sees it as pathology. As Emily Mayhew points out, most military care providers
respond to the intensity of loss by saying: “I’ll deal with all of this when I
retire.” 142 However, if not properly processed, the depth of loss that comes with
armed conflict, creates a situation which Emmanuel Kantongole describes as
“the living on top of [their] dead.” 143 Kantongole’s work focuses on the sociopolitical importance of communal healing after experiencing the violence and
devastation of warfare. 144 He claims that the public dimension of mourning
through a communal expression of grief is essential to healing the “cosmic
bond[s] of human existence that are threatened by violence.” 145 In other words,
there can be no just and lasting peace erected from the human cost of war if the
loss is not fully mourned by all as a social process of reconstruction. As a
theological just war theorist who believes that the only proper reason for
engaging in any armed conflict is the construction of a just and lasting peace, it
is this concern that presses me most intellectually and personally.
Currently, grief is not communalized and accepted into the normative
understanding about warfare in the military organization or civilian society and
leaves individual care providers and injured service members on their own when
attempting to navigate the emotionally chaotic experience of making meaning
from their losses. The following narrative from a military care provider
highlights this point:
If you really believe that you were not affected … watching your patient die
while you treated them in the mud and under fire—you are an idiot … I did not
realise that the intimacy of just being present when a patient died would create
an existential bond that would always be remembered … It was also likely that
some decision made using an in-the-moment survival mentality would breach
our own deeply held moral beliefs. And when we revisit them absent the drama
and without the support of like-minded individuals, we know there can be no
do-overs—only the do-laters that will become our challenges for the future. 146

Whether or not the military ever engages in LSCO in the future, ritual mourning
in support of nationalism is a reality with which I fundamentally believe we all
need to address as an American society. While culturally, politically, medically,
and militarily taboo, I believe it is essential to truly understand the ordinary—
not the valorized—reality of what it means to prepare for, engage in, and come

142. MAYHEW, supra note 27, at 260.
143. EMMANUEL KATONGOLE, BORN FROM LAMENT: THE THEOLOGY AND POLITICS OF HOPE
IN AFRICA 72 (2017).
144. See id. at 95.
145. Id.
146. Jeffrey L. Brown, The Moral Matrix of Wartime Medicine, INTIMA, Fall 2015, at 1, 5–6.
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home from war. This includes the reality of death and dying for military care
providers and the service members they support in deployment. Though mere
speculation, it seems possible that death despair has also set up a set of
conditions that make diseases of despair possible in the military. As such,
treating death despair may be a pathway forward in reducing the number of
preventable non-combat related deaths in the military.

